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Abstract
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications are increasingly supporting high-
way operations such as electronic toll collection, carpooling, and vehicle platooning.
In this paper we study the incentives of strategic misbehavior by individual vehicles
who can exploit the security vulnerabilities in V2I communications and negatively
impact the highway operations. We consider a V2I-enabled highway segment fac-
ing two classes of vehicles (agent populations), each with an authorized access to
one server (subset of lanes). Vehicles are strategic in that they can misreport their
class (type) to the system operator and get an unauthorized access to the server
dedicated to the other class. This misbehavior causes additional congestion exter-
nality on the compliant vehicles, and thus, needs to be deterred. We focus on an
environment where the operator is able to inspect the vehicles for misbehavior. The
inspection is costly and successful detection incurs a fine on the misbehaving vehi-
cle. We formulate a signaling game to study the strategic interaction between the
vehicle classes and the operator. Our equilibrium analysis provides conditions on
the cost parameters that govern the vehicles’ incentive to misbehave or not. We
also determine the operator’s equilibrium inspection strategy.
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Highway Systems.
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1 Introduction
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications are com-
monly regarded as integral features of smart highway systems [1, 2]. With the projected
growth of V2I and V2V capabilities, it is expected that they will support important oper-
ations such as safety-preserving maneuvers (overtaking), lane management, intersection
control, and also enable traffic management with connected/autonomous vehicles [3, 4],
[5]. These applications typically require the presence of road-side units (RSUs) that are
capable of receiving messages from individual vehicles (i.e., their on-board units (OBUs)),
authenticating these messages, and providing relevant information to the neighboring ve-
hicles and/or actuators (e.g., traffic signals). This message exchange is typically supported
by the Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) technology, which enables the
RSU to gather information such as vehicle identifier, vehicle class, and safety-related data.
In recent years, numerous security concerns have been identified in this context [6], [7], [8].
Prior research in security of vehicular communications has focused on the identification
of vulnerabilities and design of defense solutions to prevent, detect, and respond to var-
ious security threats [9]. However, an aspect that has received relatively little attention
is the modeling of strategic misbehavior by vehicles that can negatively impact highway
operations.
In this paper, we focus on a generic setting of lane management operation enabled
by V2I communications, and develop a model of strategic misbehavior using a signaling
game formulation. To motivate the setting, let us consider a highway segment with a
downstream bottleneck; see Fig.1. The highway is equipped with a RSU and all incoming
vehicles have OBUs. The highway section has two classes of lanes: the high-priority
lanes are meant to serve the travelers with preferential access to the system, and the
low-priority (or general purpose) lanes are meant to serve all other travelers. We consider
the two sets of lanes as parallel servers. The RSU receives and authenticates the messages
from the incoming vehicles. A vehicle is provided access to a server if the RSU is able to
authenticate its message and adjudge it to be a vehicle belonging to that class. The travel
cost incurred in accessing each server increases with the aggregate number of vehicles
routed through that server due to the congestion effects. We assume that the two classes
are pre-established using well-known economic principles.
Figure 1: A V2I-based highway operations.
The main feature that we consider in the abovementioned setting is the ability of
travelers to manipulate the communication between their vehicles’ OBU and the RSU,
and obtain access to the server that does not correspond to their vehicle class. Such an
attack can be realized if the vehicles (henceforth referred to as “agents”) can misreport
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their identity information to the RSU. We consider this type of attack as an instance
of strategic misbehavior, which needs to be deterred by the system operator because it
imposes additional congestion externalities on the other travelers. Misbehavior can be
deterred using technological means such as inspecting the messages for their integrity,
checking the vehicle’s identity using video cameras, number plate recognition, or manual
inspection. On successful detection, a suitable fine can be imposed by the operator. It
is important to include the following features in modeling misbehavior: (i) The operator
has incomplete information about the priority class of incoming vehicles, in that the true
class of vehicle can be known only after inspection (which is costly); (ii) Each misbehaving
agent incurs a technological cost for manipulating its message, and is subject to a fine if
inspected. These features naturally lead us to pose our model as a signaling game [10].
In our game, the agents are non-atomic and each agent has private information about
its type; i.e., each agent privately knows whether she is a high- or low-priority agent. The
operator has the technological capability of message collection (via the RSU), inspection,
and fine collection. We say that an agent misbehaves if she sends a signal that is different
from her true type and obtains access to the lane (server) that does not correspond to
her true type. All agents are subject to inspection by the operator. A misbehaving agent
incurs a non-negative cost, and if detected, is charged a non-negative fine.
The equilibrium concept that we use is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) [11].
In the PBE, (a) the players satisfy sequential rationality, and (b) the operator’s belief is
consistent with the prior distribution of agent types and the agents’ strategy. The specific
features that distinguish our game from the classical models of signaling games are: non-
atomic agent populations, and congestion externality imposed by an agent on other agents
sending the same signal (i.e. accessing the same server). Under mild assumptions on the
cost functions of both servers, we provide a complete characterization of the PBE for our
signaling game.
In particular, we show that in equilibrium (i) a high priority agent does not have
the incentive to misbehave for gaining access to the low-priority server; (ii) not every
low-priority agent misbehaves. Moreover, we distinguish two regimes based on how the
technological cost of misbehavior compares with the maximum gain from misbehavior
(evaluated as the difference in travel costs of two servers when no agent misbehaves).
In the first regime, the misbehavior is completely deterred as the technological cost of
misbehavior is high and the operator does not need to inspect any agent. In the second
regime, the low-priority agents misbehave with a positive probability. The operator’s
inspection strategy in the second regime can be further distinguished by sub-regimes that
correspond to zero, partial, and complete inspection.
Our equilibrium analysis can be used to study the comparative statics with respect to
practically relevant parameters such as the fraction of each priority class, the inspection
cost, and the fine. Firstly, for given cost of misbehavior and cost of inspection, the equi-
librium misbehavior rate (and the hence the rate of inspection) decreases as the fraction
of high-priority agents increases. Secondly, fine can be effective for decreasing misbehav-
ior rate even when the inspection cost is high (relative to the cost of misbehavior), but
cannot achieve complete deterrence. Thirdly, if the fine is sufficiently high, then there is
no need to inspect all agents in equilibrium. These insights are relevant for the design
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and deployment of inspection technologies to achieve higher security levels of V2I-enabled
highway operations. Finally, we illustrate these effects in the setting of Electronic Toll
Collection (ETC), where the servers are modeled as M/M/1 queueing systems, and the
fraction of high-priority travelers (and the toll that they need to pay for priority access)
is exogenously known.
2 Modeling Misbehavior
In this section, we consider a model of lane management operations on a highway section
equipped with vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications capability, and propose a
model of strategic misbehavior for this setting.
Suppose that the highway system faces a fixed traffic demand comprised of two types
of agent populations: a high priority type, denoted h, and a low priority type, denoted
l. The fraction of type h agents is θ ∈ (0, 1), and the fraction of type l agents is 1 − θ.
Throughout this article, we assume that θ is exogenous and independent of potential
misbehavior; see Remark 1. There are two sets of lanes on the highway, H and L, which
we model as two parallel servers. In the absence of any misbehavior, server H is only
assessed by h agents, and server L by the type l agents.
Remark 1. Admittedly, the assumption of fixed fractions θ precludes us from considering
situations where the agent populations would choose their priority type (routing behavior)
in anticipation of the potential misbehavior that they may face. However, it allows us to
identify the effect of any given θ on the misbehavior rate.
To reduce his/her travel cost, an agent may manipulate his reported signal, and choose
to take the server that is not meant for his type. We use σtl (resp. σ
t
h) to denote the fraction
of l (resp. h) agents that misbehave. We denote the misbehavior strategy as σt = (σth, σ
t
l ).
Since the aggregate demand of agents using a server is determined by the relative size
of agent populations (θ), and misbehavior strategy profile (σt), we will use the notations
cθH(σ
t) (resp. cθL(σ
t)) to denote the cost of server H (resp. L).
We make the following assumptions on the cost functions:
(A1) cθH(0, 0) <∞, cθL(0, 0) <∞, cθH(0, 0) < cθL(0, 0), and cθH(0, 1) > cθL(0, 1)
(A2) cθH(σ
t
h, σ
t
l ) (resp. c
θ
L(σ
t
h, σ
t
l )) decreases in σ
t
h (resp. σ
t
l ), and increases in σ
t
l (resp. σ
t
h)
(A3) cθH(σ
t
h, σ
t
l ) increases in θ. c
θ
L(σ
t
h, σ
t
l ) decreases in θ.
(A1) reflects that server H has higher priority than server L, and ensures that both servers
face stable queues. (A2) and (A3) captures the congestion nature of the highway system.
3 Signaling game for misbehavior inspection
We now model the strategic interaction between the agent populations (travelers t) that
are prone to misbehavior and the system operator (defender d) who decides to inspect
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them based on the received messages. We consider that the agents are capable of compro-
mising the integrity of messages sent to the RSU in order to obtain access to the server
that does not correspond to their true type. Recall that the operator cannot know an
agent’s true type unless she inspects the agent. This information asymmetry between the
agents and the operator naturally leads to a signaling game formulation.
In the game, each agent type is modeled as a population of non-atomic players. The
cost of misbehavior is non-negative for each type h agent, denoted pth ∈ R≥0, and strictly
positive for each type l agent, denoted ptl ∈ R>0.1
As mentioned before, the operator does not know the type of each agent, but can
observe the agent’s signal, i.e. the server taken by the agent. The signal space is the set
of servers {H,L}. We say that a type l (resp. type h) agent misbehaves if she chooses the
server H (resp. L). The operator forms a belief of the true type given the observed signal.
We denote β(H)
∆
= (β(h|H), β(l|H)) (resp. β(L) ∆= (β(h|L), β(l|L))) as the operator’s
belief given the signal H (resp. L), where β(h|H) and β(l|H) (resp. β(h|L) and β(l|L)) are
the posterior probabilities that an agent on the server H (resp. L) is in fact a type h and
l agent, respectively. Based on the signal and the belief, the operator chooses to inspect
an agent (I), or not to inspect (N). The inspection incurs a positive cost on the operator,
denoted pd ∈ R>0. We denote σdH (resp. σdL) as the probability of inspecting an agent on
the server H (resp. L). Then, the operator’s inspection strategy is σd
∆
=
(
σdH, σ
d
L
)
, and the
strategy profile is σ
∆
=
(
σt, σd
)
. Furthermore, for simplicity, we assume that if an agent
misbehaves, and if he is inspected, then the misbehavior is detected with probability 1.2
A fine Fh ∈ R≥0 (resp. Fl ∈ R≥0) is charged to the type h (resp. l) agent if his misbehavior
is detected.
We are now ready to discuss the utility functions of the agents and the operator. The
utility of each agent is the summation of three parts: (i) −cθH(σt) (resp. −cθL(σt)), which
is the travel cost if the agent chooses the server H (resp. L); (ii) −pth (resp. −ptl), which
is the technology cost of misbehavior for a type h (resp. l) agent; (iii) −Fh (−Fl), which
is the fine if the misbehavior is detected upon inspection of a type h (resp. l) agent. The
utility of the operator is the summation of two parts: (i) −pd, which is the inspection
cost; (ii) Fh (resp. Fl), which is collected fine when the misbehavior of a type h (resp. l)
agent is detected.
The game is played in the following steps; see Fig. 2. First, the type of each agent is
chosen by the fictitious player “Nature” according to the probability distribution Pr(h) =
θ and Pr(l) = 1 − θ. Then the agents send the signal (choose the server) according to
strategy σt based on their type. Next, the operator observes the signal, and the belief
β is updated based on the observed signal. The operator then chooses to inspect or not
according to σd. All the game parameters are common knowledge, except that each agent
privately knows his type.
1We make this technical assumption to avoid triviality in equilibrium analysis. It is consistent with
our setting of differentiated priority system.
2If the probability of detection is smaller than 1, then the effective inspection rate is simply the
total inspection rate scaled by the detection probability. Our analysis approach can be straightforwardly
extended to this case.
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Figure 2: Game Tree with the agent’s utility (top) and the operator’s utility (bottom)
indicated at each leaf node.
Given strategy profile σ, we denote the expected utility of type h agents choosing the
server H (resp. L) as Eσ[U th(H)] (resp. Eσ[U
t
h(L)]). The expected utilities for type l agents
are similarly denoted as Eσ[U tl (H)] and Eσ[U
t
h(H)], respectively. The expected utilities of
agents can be written as follows:
Eσ[U
t
h(H)] = −cθH(σt), Eσ[U th(L)] = −cθL(σt)− pth − FhσdL, (1a)
Eσ[U
t
l (H)] = −cθH(σt)− ptl − FlσdH, Eσ[U tl (L)] = −cθL(σt). (1b)
Given any strategy profile σ and any belief β, the expected utility of the operator when
observing signal H (resp. L) is denoted as Eσ[UdH|β] (resp. Eσ[UdL|β]), which can be written
as follows:
Eσ[U
d
H|β] =
(−pd + Flβ(l|H))σdH, (2a)
Eσ[U
d
L|β] =
(−pd + Fhβ(h|L))σdL. (2b)
Note that in all the cost functions (1a)-(1b) and (2a)-(2b), the travel cost is the expected
travel time multiplied with the value of time, and hence can be treated as a monetary
cost, similar to the fine and misbehavior cost.
The equilibrium concept in this game is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), see
[11]:
Definition 1. A pair (σ∗, β∗) of strategy profile σ∗ and belief assessment β∗ is a PBE if
it satisfies both sequential rationality and consistency:
• Sequential rationality: (i) The servers that are used by each type of agents incur the
highest expected utility:
σt∗h > 0 ⇒ Eσ∗ [U th(L)] ≥ Eσ∗ [U th(H)], (3a)
σt∗h < 1 ⇒ Eσ∗ [U th(L)] ≤ Eσ∗ [U th(H)], (3b)
σt∗l > 0 ⇒ Eσ∗ [U tl (H)] ≥ Eσ∗ [U tl (L)], (3c)
σt∗l < 1 ⇒ Eσ∗ [U tl (H)] ≤ Eσ∗ [U tl (L)]. (3d)
(ii) The operator maximizes expected utility:
σd∗H = arg maxσdH∈[0,1] Eσ[U
d
H|β∗], σd∗L = arg maxσdL∈[0,1] Eσ[U
d
L|β∗] (4)
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• Consistency: β∗ is updated according to the agent’s strategy σ∗ using the Bayes’
rule:
β∗(h|H) = θ (1− σ
t∗
h )
θ (1− σt∗h ) + (1− θ)σt∗l
, (5a)
β∗(h|L) = θσ
t∗
h
θσt∗h + (1− θ) (1− σt∗l )
, (5b)
and β∗(l|H) = 1− β∗(h|H), β∗(l|L) = 1− β∗(h|L).
We offer two remarks on PBE. First, with regard to the sequential rationality of
agents, the rationality constraints (3a) and (3c) ensure that if the agents of a given type
misbehave with positive probability in equilibrium, then the expected utility in choosing to
access the other server is no less than the expected utility in choosing to access the server
corresponding to their own type. On the other hand, constraints (3b) and (3d) ensure
that if agents use the server for their true type with positive probability in equilibrium,
then the utility of choosing the other server is not strictly higher.
Second, the consistency of beliefs requires that the operator’s updated belief of each
type given the received signal is consistent with the prior distribution and the agents’
strategy in accordance with the Bayes’ rule. The operator then chooses the optimal
inspection rate based on her belief.
4 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we characterize the PBE of the signaling game. In Sec. 4.1, we show
three properties of PBE that are crucial for equilibrium analysis. In Sec. 4.2, we focus on
analyzing the equilibrium regimes, where the properties of PBE are qualitatively distinct.
4.1 General properties of PBE
From (A1), we know that the costs of both servers are finite when no agent misbehaves.
The following lemma guarantees stability in PBE, i.e. the costs of both servers are also
finite in equilibrium.
Lemma 1. In any PBE, cθH(σ
t∗) <∞ and cθL(σt∗) <∞.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. If cθH(σ
t∗) =∞, the aggregate amount of agents taking
server H in equilibrium must be higher than that without misbehavior. Hence, the amount
of agents on server L is lower than that without misbehavior, which ensures cθL(σ
t∗) <∞.
Given any operator’s strategy σd ∈ [0, 1], from (1), we must have Eσ∗ [U th(H)] < Eσ∗ [U th(L)]
and Eσ∗ [U tl (H)] < Eσ∗ [U
t
l (L)]. From (3b) and (3c), we have σ
t∗
h = 1 and σ
t∗
l = 0, i.e.
no agents use server H in equilibrium. This contradicts the claim that cθH(σ
t∗) = ∞.
Analogously, we argue that cθL(σ
t∗) <∞.
The next proposition shows that type h agents do not misbehave in equilibrium.
Consequently, the operator does not inspect agents that choose to access the server L.
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Proposition 1. In any PBE, (σ∗, β∗) satisfies:
σt∗h = 0, σ
d∗
L = 0, β
∗(l|L) = 1, β∗(h|L) = 0.
Proof. We first prove σt∗h = 0 by contradiction. Assume that there exists a PBE such
that σt∗h > 0, i.e. there exists a fraction of type h agents using server L. From (1a)
and (3a), we must have −cθL(σt∗) − pth
(1a)
≥ Eσ∗ [U th(L)]
(3a)
≥ Eσ∗ [U th(H)]
(1a)
= −cθH(σt∗).
Thus, cθL(σ
t∗) ≤ cθH(σt∗) − pth. Since pth ≥ 0, cθL(σt∗) ≤ cθH(σt∗). From (1b), we have
Eσ∗ [U tl (L)]
(1b)
= −cθL(σt∗) ≥ −cθH(σt∗)
(1b)
> Eσ∗ [U tl (H)]. Hence, from (3c), we must have
σt∗l = 0, i.e. no agents of type l take server H. Additionally, since cL(σ
t) is increasing in σth
and decreasing in σtl , when σ
t∗
h > 0 and σ
t∗
l = 0, we have c
θ
L(σ
t∗) > cθL(0, 0). Analogously,
cH(σ
t) is increasing in σtl and decreasing in σ
t
h, and thus c
θ
H(σ
t∗) < cθH(0, 0). Consequently,
we derive cθH(0, 0) > c
θ
H(σ
t∗) ≥ cθL(σt∗) > cθL(0, 0), which contradicts (A1). Therefore,
σt∗h = 0.
Next, from (5), we can check that the belief updated by Bayes’ rule satisfies β∗(l|L) = 1
and β∗(h|L) = 0.
Finally, since β∗(l|L) = 1 implies that only type l agents take server L. From (2b),
the action I is strictly dominated by the action N. Hence, σd∗L = 0.
In addition, the next proposition ensures that not all type l agents misbehave in
equilibrium.
Proposition 2. In any PBE, σt∗l < 1.
Proof. Again we prove this claim by contradiction. Assume that σt∗l = 1, i.e. all the
agents of type l uses server H. From Proposition 1, agents of type h do not use server
L in equilibrium. Therefore, in PBE, no agents use server L. From (A1), we know
that Eσ∗ [U tl (L)] = −cθL(0, 1) > −cθH(0, 1) ≥ Eσ∗ [U tl (H)], which contradicts the equilibrium
condition in (3c). Hence, σt∗l < 1.
From Propositions 1 – 2, we can conclude that both servers are used in equilibrium.
This implies that “pooling” equilibrium, in which agents of different types send identical
signals, does not exist in our game. Consequently, we can drop σt∗h , β
∗(·|L) and σd∗L in
our further analysis. For simplicity, we abuse the notation and use cθH(σ
t
l ) (resp. c
θ
L(σ
t
l ))
to denote the cost of server H (resp. L) when type l agents’ strategy is σtl , and σ
t
h = 0.
Additionally, we define ∆cθ(σtl ) as the cost difference between L and H when the strategy
of type l agents is σtl :
∆cθ(σtl )
∆
= cθL(σ
t
l )− cθH(σtl ).
The function ∆cθ(σtl ) evaluates the incentive of a type l agent to misbehave given that
the fraction of misbehaving type l agents is σtl . From Assumptions (A2)-(A3), we know
that this incentive strictly decreases in type l’s misbehavior rate σtl and the fraction of
type h agents θ. We can thus properly define the function
(
∆cθ
)−1
, which is the inverse
of ∆cθ.
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4.2 Equilibrium regimes
We now provide a full characterization of PBE. From Propositions 1-2, we know that in
general, there are two possible cases in equilibrium: In the first case, no agent of type l
takes server H, which means misbehavior is completely deterred; and in the other case, a
fraction of type l agent population takes server H. Indeed, we find that there exist two
equilibrium regimes, each corresponding to one of the two cases. Furthermore, the second
regime (i.e. a positive fraction of type l agents take server H) can be divided into three
subregimes depending on whether the inspection rate of the operator on server H is zero,
positive or one.
Before presenting the equilibrium structure, we introduce the following misbehavior
threshold rate:
σ̂tl
∆
=
pdθ
(1− θ)(Fl − pd) . (6)
Note that the threshold σ̂tl is dependent on the inspection cost p
d, the fine Fl, and the
relative class size θ.
The next lemma provides the best response correspondence σd∗H in equilibrium.
Lemma 2. Given any PBE, if 0 < pd ≤ (1− θ)Fl, and
- If σt∗l < σ̂
t
l , then β
∗(l|H) < pd/Fl and σd∗H = 0
- If σt∗l = σ̂
t
l , then β
∗(l|H) = pd/Fl and σd∗H ∈ [0, 1]
- If σt∗l > σ̂
t
l , then β
∗(l|H) > pd/Fl and σd∗H = 1.
Additionally, if pd > (1− θ)Fl, then σd∗H = 0.
Proof. First, we can check that if 0 < pd ≤ (1− θ)Fl, then σ̂tl ∈ [0, 1]. From (5), we know
that if σt∗l = σ̂
t
l , then β
∗(l|H) = pd/Fl. In this case, −pd + Flβ∗(l|H) = 0, and thus any
σd∗H ∈ [0, 1] maximizes Eσ[UdH|β∗] in (2a). Additionally, since β∗(l|H) increases in σt∗l , if
σt∗l < σ̂
t
l , we must have β
∗(l|H) < pd/Fl. Consequently, −pd + Flβ∗(l|H) < 0, and from
(2a) and (4), σd∗H = 0. The case for σ
t∗
l > σ̂
t
l can be argued analogously.
Additionally, we argue for the case in which pd > (1 − θ)Fl. Following from (5) and
the fact that σt∗l ∈ [0, 1] as well as σt∗h = 0, we have β∗(l|H) = 1 − θθ+(1−θ)σt∗l ≤ 1 − θ.
Hence, if pd > (1 − θ)Fl, then −pd + Flβ∗(l|H) < 0. From (2a) and (4), we know that
σd∗H = 0.
Lemma 2 shows that the probability of detecting a misbehavior on server H is no
higher than (1− θ), which is achieved only when all type l agents misbehave. Therefore,
the maximum expected fine is (1−θ)Fl. If the inspection cost is higher than the maximum
expected fine, then the operator does not inspect any agent. On the other hand, if the
inspection cost is lower than the maximum expected fine, then following the belief update
rule (5), σ̂tl leads to the belief β
∗(l|H) = pd/Fl, which is the threshold belief such that the
operator is indifferent between the action I and N in equilibrium. If σt∗l is higher (resp.
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lower) than σ̂tl , then the operator inspects the agents taking the server H with probability
one (resp. zero).
Additionally, note that as the fraction of h type goes to zero (i.e. θ → 0), the threshold
σ̂tl → 0, which implies that the defender will tend to inspect with probability 1. This is
intuitive because when the fraction of type h is small, even if the misbehavior rate of
type l agent is low, the operator still has a high chance of detecting a misbehavior by
inspecting agents on the server H.
We next introduce the equilibrium regimes in terms of the misbehavior cost ptl and
the inspection cost pd:3
1. In regime A, ptl satisfies p
t
l > ∆c
θ(0).
2. In regime B, ptl satisfies p
t
l < ∆c
θ(0). There are three subregimes of regime B.
Subregime B1:
{(
ptl , p
d
) ∣∣∣∣ max{∆cθ(σ̂tl ), 0} < ptl < ∆cθ(0), and0 < pd < (1− θ)Fl
}⋃{(
ptl , p
d
) ∣∣∣∣ 0 < ptl < ∆cθ(0), andpd > (1− θ)Fl
}
(7)
Subregime B2: (ptl , pd)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
max{∆cθ(σ̂tl )− Fl, 0} < ptl
< max{∆cθ(σ̂tl ), 0}, and
0 < pd < (1− θ)Fl.
 (8)
Subregime B3: {(
ptl , p
d
) ∣∣∣∣ 0 < ptl < max{∆cθ(σ̂tl )− Fl, 0}, and0 < pd < (1− θ)Fl.
}
(9)
Note that the boundaries of subregimes are non-linear since the threshold σ̂tl is non-linear
in the inspection cost pd. The interpretations of regime boundaries will be straightforward
after we present the PBE in each regime. Note that the regime A, and subregimes B1
and B2 are non-empty, but subregime B3 can be empty if the fine Fl is sufficiently high.
We are now ready to fully characterize the PBE.
Theorem 1. PBE is unique in each regime, and can be written as follows:
(a) Regime A:
σt∗l = 0, σ
d∗
H = 0, β
∗(h|H) = 1, β∗(l|H) = 0. (10)
(b) Regime B:
Subregime B1:
σt∗l =
(
∆cθ
)−1
(ptl), σ
d∗
H = 0, (11a)
β∗(h|H) = θ
θ + (1− θ)σt∗l
, β∗(l|H) = (1− θ)σ
t∗
l
θ + (1− θ)σt∗l
(11b)
3Due to space limitations, we only discuss generic cases, where the game parameters are in the interior
of each regime.
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Subregime B2:
σt∗l = σ̂
t
l , σ
d∗
H =
∆cθ(σ̂tl )− ptl
Fl
, (12a)
β∗(h|H) = Fl − p
d
Fl
, β∗(l|H) = p
d
Fl
(12b)
Subregime B3:
σt∗l =
(
∆cθ
)−1
(ptl + Fl), σ
d∗
H = 1, (13a)
β∗(h|H) = θ
θ + (1− θ)σt∗l
, β∗(l|H) = (1− θ)σ
t∗
l
θ + (1− θ)σt∗l
(13b)
The proof of this theorem is in Appendix A.
Now we discuss the equilibrium structure in detail. First, we interpret the regime
boundaries:
(i) Regimes A and B are distinguished by the threshold ∆cθ(0), which is the travel
cost reduction that a type l agent can enjoy by misbehaving given that all the other
agents are complaint.
(ii) In regime B, the threshold (1− θ)Fl is the maximal expected fine obtained by the
operator. We say that the inspection cost is high if pd is higher than (1− θ)Fl, and
low otherwise.
Additionally, the threshold ∆cθ(σ̂tl ) is the gain from misbehavior when the misbe-
havior rate is σ̂tl and the operator does not inspect any agent, and the threshold
∆cθ(σ̂tl )−Fl is the gain when the operator inspects all agents on the server H. We say
that the misbehavior cost ptl is relatively high compared to p
d, if ptl > ∆c
θ(σ̂tl ); rela-
tively medium if ∆cθ(σ̂tl )−Fl < ptl < ∆cθ(σ̂tl ), and relatively low if ptl < ∆cθ(σ̂tl )−Fl.
We can relate the equilibrium strategy profiles and the conditions determining the
regime boundaries:
[Regime A]: Misbehavior cost ptl > ∆c
θ(0). Misbehavior is fully deterred, and no inspec-
tion is needed.
[Regime B]: Misbehavior cost ptl < ∆c
θ(0). Misbehavior occurs with positive probability.
- B1: Misbehavior cost is relatively high or the inspection cost is high. The operator
does not inspect. The misbehavior rate is such that server H and L incur identical
utility for type l agents given that no agent is inspected.
- B2: Misbehavior cost is relatively medium and the inspection cost is low. The opera-
tor inspects a positive fraction of agents. Misbehavior rate is equal to the threshold
σ̂tl in (6).
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- B3: Misbehavior cost is relatively low and the inspection cost is low. The operator
inspects all the agents. The misbehavior rate is such that server H and L incur
identical utility for type l agents given that all agents on server H is inspected.
Moreover, this rate is higher than the threshold σ̂tl .
We summarize how PBE changes with the misbehavior and inspection costs in table
1:
A B1 B2 B3
ptl increases
σt∗l − ↓ − ↓
σd∗H − − − −
pd increases
σt∗l − − ↑ −
σd∗H − − ↓ −
Table 1: Qualitative properties of PBE
The main implications of our equilibrium analysis are as follows:
- The misbehavior is completely deterred only when the misbehavior cost is suffi-
ciently high.
- In subregime B2, the belief β
∗(H) does not depend on θ. The intuition is that in this
subregime, both the agents and the operator use mixed strategies in equilibrium,
thus, the threshold strategy σ̂tl in (6) increases in θ to ensure that the belief β
∗(l|H)
(resp. β∗(h|H)) is maintained at the threshold value pd/Fl (resp. 1− pd/Fl), which
makes the operator indifferent between I and N.
- One can verify the intuitive property that the utility of the type l (resp. h)
agents is non-increasing (resp. non-decreasing) in ptl and non-decreasing (resp.
non-increasing) in pd. Similarly, the operator’s utility is non-decreasing in ptl and
non-increasing in pd.
- In general, the misbehavior rate σt∗l is non-increasing in p
t
l , and non-decreasing in
pd. The inspection rate σd∗H is non-decreasing in p
t
l , and non-increasing in p
d.
Finally, from (A3), we know that the minimal technology cost needed to deter mis-
behavior, ∆cθ(0), decreases in θ. Also, ∆cθ(σ̂tl ) decreases in θ. Therefore, as θ increases,
the sizes of the regime A and the subregime B1 increase, and the sizes of the two other
subregimes decrease. This implies that the misbehavior rate is lower and the inspection
is less needed when more agents are of type h.
Moreover, as the fine Fl increases, the size of B2 increases, and the size of B3 decreases
or becomes empty. However, Fl has no effect on A and B1, where inspection is not needed.
This observation implies that (i) Fine is effective in reducing the misbehavior rate when
the inspection cost is relatively high compared to the misbehavior cost, but cannot fully
deter misbehavior, and (ii) If the fine is higher than ∆cθ(0), then the operator will not
inspect all agents.
12
5 Toll Evasion Example
We apply our equilibrium results to a specific example of Electronic Toll Collection (ETC)
system. In the ETC setting, server H (resp. L) represents the tolled (resp. toll-free) lanes.
Type h are the agents that are willing to pay the toll, and type l are the agents that are
not willing to pay. The total arrival rate of both types of agents is λ = 2400 veh/hr. The
fraction θ = 0.3 is the fraction of type h agents. Therefore, the arrival rate of type h
(resp. l) agents is θλ (resp. (1− θ)λ).
The toll is collected electronically, and the access to the tolled lanes is granted to
the paying agents after the RSU obtains their reported identifier. Such an operation is
technologically feasible; see e.g. the European DSRC Toll Collection systems [2].
We model the highway as two parallel M/M/1 queuing systems, one representing the
tolled lanes (H), and the other representing the toll-free lanes (L). For background on
modeling highway traffic with stochastic queuing models, see [12]. Both the tolled lanes
and the toll-free lanes have a capacity (service rate) of 1700 veh/hr, i.e. µH = µL = 1700
veh/hr. The travel cost on a server is the product of the expected system time and the
value of time VoT = 50 USD/hr. The fine is Fl = 100 USD. Following standard results
in queuing theory, the expected cost functions are as follows:
cθH(σ) =
{
VoT
µH−θλ(1−σth)−(1−θ)λσtl , if θλ(1− σ
t
h) + (1− θ)λσtl < µH,
∞, o.w.
cθL(σ) =
{
VoT
µL−(1−θ)λ(1−σtl )−θλσth , if (1− θ)λ(1− σ
t
l ) + θλσ
t
h < µL,
∞, o.w.
We can check that the cost functions satisfy Assumptions (A1) - (A3). Fig. 3 illustrates
the regimes of PBE.
Figure 3: PBE regimes.
In this example, the minimum ptl that deters misbehavior is ∆c
θ(0) = 2.35 USD. Note
that this is the technology cost per signal. A device that is used to manipulate the message
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sent to the RSU can be expensive, but if the device is repeatedly used, the average cost
can be low.
Additionally, since the fine Fl = 100 > ∆c
θ(0) = 2.35, the sub-regime B3 is empty.
This implies that given any ptl and p
d, the operator will not inspect all agents. Given
parameters in B2, p
t
l = 0.5 USD and p
d = 5 USD, the equilibrium misbehavior rate is
σt∗l = σ̂
t
l = 2.15%, and the inspection rate is σ
d∗
H = 0.34%.
6 Concluding remarks
In this article, we introduced a signaling game to study the effects of operator inspection
strategy on the strategic misbehavior in a V2I-based highway system. Our model captures
three key features: (a) Travelers’ ability to exploit the vulnerabilities of V2I communica-
tions; (b) The incomplete and asymmetric information on the part of operator resulting
from lack of direct observability of travelers’ true type; (c) Congestion externality on the
compliant travelers resulting from misbehavior. We provided a complete characterization
of PBE, and derived comparative statics with respect to practically relevant parameters
such as fine, costs of multi-priority lanes, and technological costs of inspection and mis-
behavior. These results suggest guidelines for the design and deployment of inspection
technologies for smart transportation systems, and are relevant to a class of strategic
integrity attacks, where deterrence via inspection is socially desirable.
Appendix A Proof of Theorem 1
(a) In regime A, since ptl > ∆c
θ(0), from (1b), we have Eσ∗ [U tl (H)] ≤ −cθH(σt∗l ) − ptl <
−cθL(σt∗l ) = Eσ∗ [U tl (L)]. Therefore, from (3c), we must have σt∗l = 0. From (5), we
can check that β∗(h|H) = 1 and β∗(l|H) = 0. Following from Lemma 2, σd∗H = 0.
Thus, the PBE in (10) is the unique equilibrium.
(b) In regime B, we first prove by contradiction that σt∗l ∈ (0, 1). Assume that σt∗l = 0,
then from (4) and (5), β∗ and σd∗L must be in (10). Then, from (1b), Eσ∗ [U
t
l (L)] =
−cθL(0). However, if type l agents deviate to choose H, the utility is −cθH(0) − ptl .
Since in regime B, ptl < ∆c
θ(0), type l agents has incentive to deviate to H, which
contradicts σt∗l = 0. Additionally, from Proposition 2, σ
t∗
l < 1. Therefore, in this
regimes σt∗l ∈ (0, 1), i.e. type l agents take both servers in equilibrium, which implies
the follows:
Eσ∗ [U
t
l (L)] = Eσ∗ [U
t
l (H)]. (15)
Furthermore, there are three cases for σd∗H : σ
d∗
H = 0, σ
d∗
H ∈ (0, 1) and σd∗H = 1. It turns
out that these three cases correspond to subregime B1, B2 and B3, respectively.
(B2) σ
d∗
H ∈ (0, 1): In this case, from Lemma 2, we know that β∗(l|H) must be pd/Fl,
and σt∗l = σ̂
t
l in (6) is the unique equilibrium strategy. Additionally, from (15),
the operator’s strategy σd∗L should satisfy −cθL(σt∗l ) = −cθH(σt∗l ) − ptl − Flσd∗L .
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Thus, σd∗L is in (12a). Furthermore, we can check that when p
d and ptl satisfy
(8), the strategies and the beliefs in (12) are all feasible. Therefore, PBE in
(12) is the unique equilibrium.
(B1) σ
d∗
H = 0: In this case, From (15), we must have Eσ∗ [U
t
l (H)] = −cθH(σt∗l )− ptl =
−cθL(σt∗l ) = Eσ∗ [U tl (L)], which leads to ∆cθ(σt∗l ) = ptl . From (5), β∗ is in (11b).
We now argue that the strategy in (11) is indeed a PBE if the cost parameters
satisfy (7). We have argued that the condition ptl < ∆c
θ(0) is needed to ensure
that σt∗l ∈ (0, 1).
If pd > (1− θ)Fl, then from Lemma 2, we know that σd∗H = 0. If pd < (1− θ)Fl,
then again from Lemma 2, as long as σt∗l < σ̂
t
l , σ
d∗
H = 0. Since ∆c
θ(σtl ) decreases
in σtl and ∆c
θ(σt∗l ) = p
t
l , we must have p
t
l = ∆c
θ(σt∗l ) > ∆c
θ(σ̂tl ), which leads
to constraints in (7).
(B3) σ
d∗
H = 1: In this case, from (15), we obtain Eσ∗ [U
t
l (L)] = −cθL(σt∗l ) = −cθH(σt∗l )−
ptl − Fl = Eσ∗ [U tl (H)]. Therefore, σt∗l satisfies ∆cθ(σt∗l ) = ptl + Fl. From (5),
β∗ is obtained from (13b). To ensure that the action I is a dominant strategy
for the operator, from Lemma 2, we need pd < (1 − θ)Fl, and σt∗l > σ̂tl .
Besides, ∆cθ(σt∗l ) decreases in σ
t∗
l and ∆c
θ(σt∗l ) = p
t
l +F , we can conclude that
ptl + F = ∆c
θ(σt∗l ) < ∆c
θ(σ̂tl ), i.e. p
t
l satisfies (9). 
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